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could be imposed for .conditions on property not owned by
or under defendant's control.
In view of the foregoing it cannot fairly be said that the
error, if any, in giving the instruction complained of, was
prejudicial, and the judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 24,
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

[L. A. No. 22166.

In Bank.

June 30, 1952.]

OLIVER 0. CLARK, Petitioner, v. STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-In a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, findings of fact by local
administrative committee and board of governors are not binding on the Supreme Court, which can pass on the sufficiency
and weight of the evidence.
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Burden of Proof.Although Supreme Court is not bound by findings of local
administrative committee and of Board of Governors of State
Bar in a disciplinary proceeding, a petitioner seeking review
of the board's recommendation has the burden of showing
that it is erroneous or unlawful.
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Relationship of Parties.-Fact
that an attorney and an incompetent person occupied the
relation of guardian and ward, and not that of attorney and
client, does not preclude disciplinary action against the attorney for mishandling the assets of the incompetent person's estate.
[ 4] Guardian and Ward- Powers and Duties of Guardian.- A
guardian of an incompetent person occupies a ,position demanding of him the highest degree of diligence and good
faith. {Prob. Code, § 1400.)
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Practice of Law,§ 104.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 174; [2] Attorneys,
§ 175; [3, 6] Attorneys, § 136; [4] Guardian and Ward, §55;
[5] Guardian and Ward, §1; [7,8] Attorneys, §27; [9,10,12,13]
Attorneys, § 140; [11, 14, 18] Attorneys, § 172(9); [15, 16, 20] Attorneys, § 139; [17] Guardian and Ward, § 95; [19] Guardian
and Ward, § 93; [21] Attorneys, § 137.
39 C.2d-6
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[5] !d.-Nature of Office.-A guardian is an officer of the court
until discharged from his guardianship.
[6] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Relationship of Parties.
-When an attorney assumes a fiduciary relationship and
violates his duty in a manner that would justify disciplinary
action if the relationship had been that of attorney and client,
he may properly be disciplined for his misconduct. (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 6106.)
[7] Id.-Duties.-As a fiduciary, the law imposes on an attorney
the strictest duty of prudent conduct.
[8] Id.-Duties.-An attorney must perform his duties to the
best of his individual ability.
[9] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Commingling Trust and Individual Funds.-Commingling of trust and individual funds
is committed when a client's money is intermingled with that
of his attorney and its separate identity lost so that it may
be used for the attorney's personal expenses or subjected to
claims of his creditors.
[10] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Commingling Trust and Individual Funds.-When a client's money is kept apart from
that of his attorney, rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct ( 33 Cal.2d 30), declaring that a member of the State
Bar shall not commingle the money or property of a client
with his own, is not violated.
[11] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Evidence-Commingling Trust
and Individual Funds.-Notwithstanding evidence showing
that an attorney as guardian sold his ward's property for
cash and failed to deposit the money in· the guardianship
account, the Supreme Court, in view of the seriousness of
the charge and the lack of direct evidence of commingling,
accepted as true the attorney's testimony that he placed the
money in his safe in a large envelope marked "Bigelow Estate."
[12] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Commingling Trust and Individual Funds.-Rule against commingling of a client's money
with an attorney's own money was adopted to provide against
the danger that such commingling will result in loss of the
client's money; moral turpitude is not necessarily involved.
[13] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Commingling Trust and Individual Funds.-Although an attorney may properly place his
ward's money in his safe for a short period of time to safeguard it until he has time to deposit it in a bank, when he
keeps a large sum of his ward's money in his safe for over
three years and loses track of its whereabouts, he is guilty
of gross negligence in the handling of his ward's funds.
[14] Id.- Disciplinary Proceedings- Evidence- Misconduct Toward Court.-Evidence sustains conclusion of Board of Gov-
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ernors of State Bar that an attorney failed to include a designated sum in his guardianship accounting to the court and
that such omission was intentional and wilful where the only
reference by which such money could be traced is an entry
under "Accounts Receivable," without giving the name of the
debtor or debtors of the estate; the account fails to reveal
that part of this money was in the attorney's possession and
not deposited in the bank; and the circumstances indicate
that the entry was made to make the books balance and to
conceal the fact that his gross negligence had caused him to
lose track of a large sum of his ward's money.
[15] Id.- Disciplinary Proceedings- Withdrawals as Guardian
Tees Without Court Approval.-An attorney was not guilty
of misconduct in making withdrawals from a ward's estate
as guardian fees without prior court approval where, at the
time such withdrawals were made, a guardianship fee could
be claimed as an item of an account and paid as such without the formality of a petition to the superior court and a
special order or decree, subject to the condition that the
amount of such withdrawal found by the court to be excessive
must be returned to the estate.
[16] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Misconduct Toward Court.An attorney is not guilty of having intentionally misled the
superior court by not expressly revealing to it that the money
in his safe belonged to a guardianship estate where he was
never directly asked whether such money was his money or
guardianship moncv.
[17] Guardian and Ward-Guardian's Accounts.-A guardian does
not comply with Frob. Code, § 1553, relating to accounts,
when he presents an account so inaccurate that investigation
by a referee becomes necessary.
[18] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Evidence-Filing Inaccurate Guardian's Accounts.-Finding of Board of Governors of State Bar that attorney failed to file within a reasonable time or until ordered by the court, an account as guardian
of an incompetent person's estate, and that the account filed
was incomplete, inaccurate and misleading, is sustained
by evidence that he admitted his negligence and that he
completely lost track of a large sum of money realized from
a real estate transaction for "about three and a half years,"
and that he submitted the account without any attempt to
ascertain if it had revealed the true state of affairs.
[19] Guardian and Ward-Guardian's Accounts.-A guardian may
properly employ an accountant to perform acts involving
professional skills not possessed by the guardian, but he may
not delegate all responsibility.
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[20] Attorneys- Disciplinary Proceedings- Misconduct Toward
Court.-Presentation to court of an account which an attorney knew to be misleading is a ground for disciplinary action.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068(6).)
[21] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Violation of Oath and Duties
as Attorney.-Gross negligence is a breach of the fiduciary
relationship that binds an attorney to the most conscientious
fidelity to the interests of his client; it warrants disciplinary
action, since it is a violation of his oath to discharge his
duties to the best of his knowledge and ability. (Bus. &
Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6103.)

PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of suspension
of an attorney for one year. Petitioner suspended for six
months.
John W. Preston for Petitioner.
Edward Hervey and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent.
THE COURT.-Petitioner Oliver 0. Clark is charged in
six counts with violation of his oath and duties as an attorney (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6103), with violation of
rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar
of California (commingling of funds), and with commission
of acts involving moral turpitude and dishonesty. (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 6106.) After a hearing, the local administrative committee found, except as to Counts One and Five, that
the acts alleged to have been committed or omitted were in
fact committed or omitted. The committee found, however,
that there was no intentional commission or omission, that
petitioner was simply guilty of ''oversight,'' ''carelessness,''
and "neglect," and recommended that the matter be dismissed. The Board of Governors of the State Bar held a
hearing at which petitioner addressed the board and answered
questions. The board admitted in evidence a letter submitted
by petitioner, reviewed the record before the local administrative committee, and found petitioner guilty as charged
on all six counts. The board recommended that petitioner
be suspended from the practice of la~ for a period of one
year. Three members dissented on the ground that the degree of discipline recommended was insufficient. In fixing
the degree of discipline to be recommended, the board took
into consideration petitioner's past record, which included
a disciplinary proceeding entitled "L.A. 1276-In the Mat-
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ter of Oliver 0. Clark, Attorney at Law (Dr. L. C. Burwell, complaining witness),'' in which the board on August
5, 1949, publicly reproved petitioner.
·
Petitioner contends that there is no evidence to support
the findings of the board. [1] The findings of fact by the
local administrative committee and the board are not binding upon this court, and upon review of a recommendation
for suspension or disbarment we pass upon the sufficiency
and weight of the evidence. (Fleming v. State Bar, 38 Cal.
2d 341, 342 [239 P.2d 866] ; Fall v. State Bar, 25 Cal.2d 149,
159 [153 P.2d 1] .) [2] The burden is on petitioner, however, to show that the recommendation of the board is erroneous or unlawful. (Alkow v. State Bar, 38 Cal.2d 257,
258 [239 P.2d 871].)
The six counts in this proceeding all arise from petitioner's
conduct as guardian of the estate of one George W. Bigelow,
an incompetent. Petitioner was appointed guardian on August 30, 1943, and continued in that capacity until the death
of his ward, December 21, 1948. Petitioner was subsequently
appointed executor of Bigelow's estate.
Petitioner filed his first annual account on December 16,
1944, and the account was approved by the court. Thereafter no accounts were filed, and on April13, 1948, the surety
on petitioner's bonds petitioned the court for an accounting.
Petitioner thereafter filed his second account on July 28,
1948, which was not approved. An amended second account
was filed on November 22, 1948, but was ordered off calendar
following Bigelow's death. On March 1, 1949, petitioner
filed a final account, approval of which was denied by the
court with instructions to file a new account for the entire
period of the guardianship. On May 23, 1949, a certified
public accountant was appointed as a referee to examine
petitioner's records. On August 29, 1949, the referee reported a cash shortage of $2,131.12 in the guardianship funds.
'rhe court found that petitioner had overcompensated himself and the estate's attorney (petitioner's son-in-law), and
had made other unauthorized expenditures, totalling $5,145.
The court also ordered petitioner to bear the costs of appointing the referee, $1,100. Petitioner was thus surcharged
for the cash shortage of $2,131.12, the unauthorized expenditures of $5,145, and the costs of appointing the referee, $1,100,
or a total of $8,376.12. The final account was approved on
that basis. The amount surcharged was repaid by petitioner
and not by the bonding company.
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[3] It should be noted at the outset that the fact that
petitioner and Bigelow occupied the relationship of guardian
and ward, and not that of attorney and client, would not
preclude disciplinary action. [4] .As guardian petitioner
occupied a position demanding of him the highest degree
of diligence and good faith. (Prob. Code, § 1400; Guardianship of Carlon, 43 Cal..App.2d 204, 208 [110 P.2d 488] .)
[5] He was an officer of the court until discharged from
his guardianship. ( G~wrdianship of Reynolds, 60 Cal..App.
2d 669, 677 [141 P.2d 498] .) He took an oath that he
would execute the duties of his trust. (Prob. Code, § 1480.)
['6] When an attorney assumes a fiduciary relationship and
violates his duty in a manner that would justify disciplinary
action if the relationship had been that of attorney and
client, he may properly be disciplined for his misconduct.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106; Petersen v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d
866, 870 [136 P.2d 561] ; Flaherty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d
483, 489 [106 P.2d 617] ; Lyders v. State Ba1·, 12 Cal.2d 261,
265 [83 P.2d 500] ; Jacobs v. State Bar, 219 Cal. 59, 64 [25
P.2d 401]; see 7 C.J.S., .Attorney and Client, § 19.)
Count One. The board found that petitioner "commingled
money belonging to George W. Bigelow, an incompetent
person, with his own money or personal effects.'' The money
referred to, at least $1,400, was received by petitioner in May,
1946, after sale of a lot owned by the ward. .After the referee
completed his audit and reported a discrepancy in the guardianship accounts, petitioner produced the money. .According
to petitioner, the money, in fifty and hundred dollar bills,
had been placed in a large envelope with the words ''Bigelow
Estate" in pencil across the front. The envelope was placed
in a locked metal box in petitioner's office, which also contained
documents and money of clients in separately marked envelopes and petitioner's own money and documents. Petitioner
did not have a personal bank account. The envelope remained
in the box, and the money was not deposited in the guardianship account for Bigelow. Petitioner explains his failure
to deposit the money on the ground that he forgot to leave
his secretary a memorandum instructing her to deposit the
funds and that the money remained in the box for over three
years through his oversight. He states that he found the
missing money ''after the report of the referee in this matter,
approximately two weeks later when it became plain to me
that the discrepancy was due to the accounting of the money
received from the Maywood lot.''

1
1
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Petitioner's explanation does not set at rest suspicions
aroused by his conduct. He was requested to produce the
envelope in which he stated that the money was placed, but
did not do so. He did not call his secretary as a witness
to corroborate his testimony. He could not account at the hearing for the amount of money that he allegedly found in the
envelope, yet he knew when he found the money that he was
under investigation, that a shortage had been discovered in
his accounts, and that he would undoubtedly be called upon
to show that he had not misappropriated the missing money.
These facts must be viewed in the light of petitioner's
background. [7] As a fiduciary, the law imposed upon him
the strictest duty of prudent conduct. Petitioner has practiced
law in California since 1907. Because he is a man of superior
intellect and wide experience, 1 his conduct is less excusable
than might otherwise be the case. [8] An attorney ''must
perform his duties to the best of his individual ability."
(Friday v. State Bar, 23 Cal.2d 501, 505 [144 P.2d 564].)
Against petitioner's version of the facts, we must balance
evidence definitely showing that petitioner sold his ward's
property for cash, that he failed to deposit the money in the
guardianship account, that over three years later a referee's
report divulged a shortage in funds, that the court and surety
demanded that petitioner make up the shortage, and that
then, but only then, petitioner produced the missing money
with an explanation that tests credulity.
The board contends that petitioner's testimony establishes
commingling on the theory that the offense was committed
when petitioner placed the envelope containing his ward's
money in the same safe with his own money. [9] Rule 92 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct (33 Ca1.2d 30) does not
define commingling, but the decisions establish that com-

1
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The record contains a letter from .John W. Preston, formerly a member of this court, stating: "I think I can fairly appraise the mental
make-up of Mr_ Clark. He is in many respects a unique character- He
has a trip hammer intellect and a superior power of expression. He is
dynamic and overflowing with energy :filled witl1 hopeful enthusiasm_
He is a sound lawyer of very wide experience. He daily overschedules
himself and as a consequence oftentimes omits or neglects material acts.
But he is not dishonest. On the contrary, he is thoughtful and considerate of the rights of others. If he could he would redeem every
pledge he has made_"
2
' 'A member of the State Bar shall not commingle the money or other
property of a client with his own; and he shall promptly report to the
client the receipt by him of all money and other property belonging
to such client.''

1
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mingling is committed when a client's money is intermingled
with that of his attorney and its separate identity lost so
that it may be used for the attorney's personal expenses or
subjected to claims of his creditors. (Bennett v. State Bar,
27 Cal.2d 31, 36 [162 P.2d 5]; Griffith v. State Bar, 26 Cal.2d
273, 276-277 [158 P.2d 1] ; Narlian v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d
876, 884-885 [136 P.2d 553]; Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47,
51 [17 P.2d 112].) [10] When the client's money is kept
apart from that of the attorney, rule 9 is not violated. (Townsend v. State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 631, 633 [226 P.2d 581] .) Accordingly, if petitioner at all times kept his ward's money
in a separate envelope in his safe, with his ward's name
plainly marked on the envelope, the money was not commingled
with petitioner's own money, within the meaning of rule 9.
[11] Whether or not the charge of commingling can
be sustained thus depends on whether or not we accept as
true petitioner's testimony that he placed the money in his
safe in a large envelope marked ''Bigelow Estate.'' In view
of the seriousness of the alleged offense and the lack of direct
evidence of commingling, we have decided, as did the local
committee, to give petitioner the benefit of doubts that might
reasonably be entertained as to his credibility, and to accept
his testimony as true. We therefore conclude that the charge
of commingling has not been proved.
Even though the offense of commingling was technically
not committed, many of the dangers that accompany violation
of rule 9 are present here. [12] The rule against commingling "was adopted to provide against the probability in
some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger
in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss
of clients' money. Moral turpitude is not necessarily involved
in the commingling of a client's money with an attorney's
own money if the client's money is not endangered by such
procedure and is always available to him. However, inherently
there is danger in such practice for frequently unforeseen
circumstances arise jeopardizing the safety of the client's
funds, and as far as the client is concerned the result is the
same whether his money is deliberately misappropriated by
an attorney or is unintentionally lost by circumstances beyond
the control of the attorney." (Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47,
51 [17 P.2d 112].) [13] Of course, an attorney may properly place his ward's money in his safe for a short period
of time to safeguard it until he has time to deposit it in a bank.
But when an attorney keeps a large sum of his ward's money
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in his safe .for over three years and loses track of its whereabouts, the evils described in the Peck case are clearly present.
Petitioner, according to his own ·version of the facts, was
guilty of gross negligence in the handling of his ward's funds.
[14] Cot{nt Two. The board found that petitioner failed
''to include the sum of $1,851.29 in his accounting to the
court, and that said omission was intentional and wilful.''
The sum referred to is the money that petitioner stated that
he found in the envelope shortly after the report of the
referee. Of this sum, at least $1,400 was from the real estate
transaction referred to in Count One. Petitioner stated at
the hearing that he did not know the source of the balance of
the money, but the report of the referee indicates that the
money was derived either from the sale of the real property
or from the sale of 18 shares of stock that belonged to the
ward. The record contains petitioner's "Complete and Final
Account of Guardian for Full Period of GuardianshipAugust 30, 1943 to December 22, 1948," filed on March 1,
1949. In his listing of estate assets, the only reference
by which the money in question could be traced is an entry,
"Accounts Receivable, $1,788.02." There is no further explanation of this entry, and the name of the debtor or debtors
of the estate is not given. 'fhe only entries under ''Total
Cash" are deposits in three guardianship accounts totalling
$4,430.28. In another part of the account, under the title
''Monies Received During Guardianship,'' petitioner lists
"net from sale of lot and water shares, $3,788.02. " 2 a
The account thus states the amount for which the ward's
property was sold, but fails to reveal that part of this money
was in the possession of petitioner and not deposited in the
bank. If petitioner knew at the time he filed his final account
in March, 1949, that the money had not been deposited in the
bank, his defense to the charge of commingling, that he did
not know the money had not been deposited until after the
report of the referee in August, 1949, could not be true. If
it is not true, and petitioner knew that the money had not
••The amount of the shortage, $1,851.29, differs from the amount for
which the ward's property was sold because $2,000 of the money re·
ceived from the sale was paid immediately to the nurse that cared for
the ward. From the referee's report it appears that the other $1,788.02
was placed in the envelope. The record does not disclose the source of
the remaining $63.27 in the envelope. Petitioner testified that he placed
$1,400 of the money received from the sale in the euvelope. Under his
version of the facts, he thus cannot account for $451.29 of the $1,851.29
in the envelope.
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been deposited, Count 'l.'wo is supported by the evidence, for
it was petitioner's duty to disclose in his final account that
he was the debtor for the amount entered under ''Accounts
Receivable." (See Civ. Code, §§ 2228, 2229, 2233; Bone v.
IIayes, 154 Cal. 759, 766 [99 P. 172] .) On the other hand,
assuming, as we did under Count One, that petitioner was
telling the truth when he told the administrative committee
that he '' assunied always that the deposit had been made,' ' 3
the evidence again supports Count Two. If the money had
been deposited, it should have appeared in the account under
''Total Cash'' deposited in the bank. What then could petitioner have meant by his entry of $1,788.02 under ''Accounts
Receivable''? When pressed for an explanation before the
administrative committee, he stated, "I thought that the difference represented by that account receivable was a difference that had probably occurred in the transmission of monies
from the general account of the guardian to the trustee account of Mrs. Gosman [the nurse who cared for the ward]."
This explanation is unacceptable since the slightest investigation would have revealed that the money was not in Mrs.
Gosman's trustee account. If petitioner had lost track of
the money, it was his duty to reveal that fact to the court.
The entry of $1,788.02 under "Accounts Receivable," however, would naturally mislead the court into believing that
that sum was due to the estate from some unnamed debtor,
such as money due from the sale of the ward's property. We
cannot escape the conclusion that the entry was made to make
the books balance and conceal the fact that petitioner's gross
negligence had caused him to lose track of a large sum of his
ward's money. 4 The finding of the board under Count Two
thus has adequate support in the evidence.
3
In defending the charge of commingling, petitioner stated ''I assumed always that the deposit had been made,'' and that he found the
money in his safe "about two weeks" after the referee's report. The
record, however, contains a letter written by petitioner to the referee
on August 16, 1949, 13 days before the report, stating that the $1,788.02
accounts receivable entry represents proceeds from the sale of the real
property ''not deposited at the date of sale.''
•The account was actually prepared by one Ralph Ritchie, an accountant
who, of course, could prepare the account only from data supplied by
petitioner. Further, the account contained the following affidavit of
petitioner: ''That he is the Guardian who makes the foregoing account
and report; he has read the foregoing Complete and Final Account of
Guardian for Full Period of Guardianship-August 30, 1943 to December 22, 1948; all the statements therein are true of his own knowledge,
except as to those matters stated on information and belief and as to
those matters he believes them to be true.''
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[15] Count TMee. 'fhe board found that petitioner "did
without order or authorization of court withdraw as guardian
fees on the dates and amounts as follows," listing nine withdrawals between December, 1944, and December, 1947, amounting to $3,350. Petitioner conceded that he made the withdrawals as compensation without prior court approval, stating that "it was my understanding that in a guardianship
matter, the guardian, subject to the approval of the court
later, had the right to compensate himself reasonably from
time to time out of the guardianship funds.''
Section 1556 of the Probate Code provided at the times
involved in this proceeding that a guardian "shall have such
compensation for his services as the court in which his accounts are settled deems just and reasonable.'' In 1951 section 1556 was amended. 5 Before this amendment it was held
that the guardianship fee could be claimed as an item of
account and paid as such without the formality of a petition
to the superior court and a special order or decree. (Estate
of Eaton, 38 CaLApp.2d 180, 184 [100 P.2d 813].) The question whether guardianship fees were excessive could be determined upon settlement in the trial court of the guardian's
account and reviewed upon appeal from the order settling the
account. (Prob. Code, § 1630.) Petitioner, therefore, could
compensate himself from the guardianship estate without prior
court approval, subject to the condition that the amount
thereof found by the court to be excessive must be returned to
the estate. Of course, if the withdrawals were in bad faith,
and were misappropriations of estate funds instead of compensation, a different problem would be presented. The board
does not contend that the withdrawals here were in bad faith.
We conclude, therefore, that the third count is unsupported
by the evidence.
"''At any time after the filing of the inventory and appraisement,
but not prior to the expiration of three months from the issuance of
letters of guardianship, any guardian may petition the court for an
order fixing and allowing his compensation for 'services rendered to that
time . . . . Upon the hearing the court shall make an order allowing
such compensation to the guardian for services rendered to the estate
of his ward . . . as the court may deem proper, and compensation so
allowed shall thereupon be charged to the estate of the ward." As
amended section 1556 is substantially similar to Probate Code, section
904, providing for allowance of commissions to executors and administrators. Under section 904 an executor or administrator is not entitled
to his commissions until after court approval. (Estate of Jones, 166
Cal. 147, 152 [135 P. 293]; see Estate of Carter, 132 Cal. 113, 114
[64 :P, :J-23, 484]; In re Rose, SO Cal. 166, 180 [22 P. 86].)
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Cottnt Four. The board found that petitioner, without
prior authorization of the court, withdrew attorney's fees
amounting to $1,300. Petitioner's son-in-law was the attorney for the estate. The foregoing discussion regarding the
third count is applicable here. ( Cf. Pro b. Code, § 1556.1,
enacted in 1951.)
[16] Count Five. The board found that on October 18,
1949, petitioner testified before Judge Paonessa in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and intentionally misled
the court by not revealing that $1,800 in petitioner's safe
belonged to the guardianship estate. The $1,800 referred to
included the $1,400 involved in Count One and another $400
that was apparently the proceeds from another sale of estate
property. The testimony before Judge Paonessa is in the
record. It there appears that counsel for the bonding company was allowed to question petitioner ''as to his ability to
make up" the shortage in his accounts revealed by the referee's report. Petitioner said that "within three days I will
pay it all in." He further stated that he had "other money"
in his safe, "approximately $1800," and "when the Court
makes the order, I will put in the full amount." Counsel for
the surety replied, "I have had your word before, and I would
rather have it before the Court, if it is possible.'' The charge
in Count Five is based on the fact that petitioner did not
expressly inform the court that the money in his safe belonged
to the guardianship estate. The questions by the attorney for
the surety, however, were directed only to the issue whether
petitioner could repay the shortage in his accounts and thus
relieve the surety of liability on its bond. Petitioner was never
directly asked whether the money in the safe was his money
or guardianship money. Accordingly, it cannot be said that
petitioner intentionally misled the court, and the finding of
the board does not have adequate support in the record.
Count Six. The board found that petitioner failed "to
file within a reasonable time, or at all, until ordered to do so
by the court, an account as guardian of the estate of George
W. Bigelow, that the account filed by respondent was incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading. That the failure of respondent to file a proper account necessitated an independent
audit to be made by the court; that said audit established that
respondent did not entirely account for all moneys received
and in possession of the respondent as guardian of the said
estate."
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Petitioner did not file an inventory and appraisement of
the guardianship estate until April 6, 1949, more than five
years after his appointment, although Probate Code, section
1550, requires the inventory and appraisement to be filed
within three months of the appointment. Petitioner concedes
that he did not comply with section 1550, but claims that
he complied with section 1553, providing that ''At the expiration of a year from the time of his appointment, and as often
thereafter as he may be required by the court, the guardian
must present his account to the court for settlement and allowance." After petitioner filed his first account in December,
1944, more than one year after his appointment, he did not
file an account until, following petition of his bonding company, he was cited to show cause why he should not file an
accounting. Petitioner thereafter filed an unacceptable current account and an unacceptable final account. It became
necessary to appoint a referee to audit petitioner's records.
[17] A guardian does not comply with section 1553 when
he presents an account so inaccurate that investigation by a
referee becomes necessary. (See Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal.
521, 527 [163 P. 893] .)
[18] The finding of the board is clearly supported by
the evidence. Petitioner testified that ''I am not attempting
to exculpate myself for being negligent, but I don't think
it was gross negligence." We disagree. The money from
the real estate transaction might never have been discovered
without the investigation. Petitioner admitted that he completely lost track of the money for ''about three and a half
years." Petitioner justified his conduct by testifying, "I
know previously I have been asked if it didn't strike me as
rather peculiar that my account should be $1,800, or any
amount, less than what it ought to be, but, you see, I have
never personally handled the matters of deposit of my monies
or keeping of records. Always that has been done by somebody else, and I am not an accountant and didn't presume
to carry in my mind how much money the estate was supposed
to have on hand. It is probably careless of me to have done
that, but nevertheless that is the way the matter came to pass.''
[19] A guardian may properly employ an accountant to
perform acts involving professional skills not possessed by
the guardian, but he may not delegate all responsibility. (See
Purdy v. Johnson, supra; Scott on Trusts, §§ 171.2, 172.)
Petitioner had the duty to make a reasonable check .on the
entries in the final account as prepared by the accountant.
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The account contains his statement that he had read the
account and that the statements therein were either true to
his own knowledge or that upon information and belief he
believed them to be true. But the account, described under
Count Two, above, was confused and incoherent. His submission of the account to the court, without any attempt to
ascertain if it had revealed the true state of affairs, significantly demonstrates petitioner's general conception of his
professional obligations. "The purpose of keeping proper
books of account, vouchers, receipts, and checks is to be
prepared to make proof of the honesty and fair dealing of
attorneys when their actions are called into question, whether
in litigation with their clients or in disciplinary proceedings
and it is a part of their duty which accompanies the relation
of attorney and client. The failure to keep proper books . . .
is in itself a suspicious circumstance." (Matter of O'Neill,
228 App.Div. 518, 520 [240 N.Y.S. 183]; see Bruns v. State
Bar, 18 Cal.2d 667, 672 [117 P.2d 327] .) In filing an incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading account petitioner was
guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties
as guardian and as an attorney.
Discipline. A consideration of petitioner's conduct leads to
the conclusion that this case reflects much more than the innocent inadvertence of a busy attorney, which petitioner suggests as an explanation justifying his actions. Petitioner intentionally included a large sum of mo:p_ey in his final account
to the court under an entry designed to mislead the court
(Count Two), and he was guilty of acts of gross negligence
in his performance of his duties as guardian. (Counts One
and Six.) [20] The presentation to the court of an account
that petitioner knew to be misleading was a ground for disciplinary action. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068(d); Pickering
v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 141, 144-145 [148 P.2d 1].) [21] Gross
negligence is a breach of the fiduciary relationship that binds
an attorney to the most conscientious fidelity to the interests
of his client. (Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal.2d 580, 583
[122 P.2d 549]; Waterman v. State Bar, 8 Cal.2d 17, 20 [63
P.2d 1133].) It warrants disciplinary action, since it is a
violation of his oath to discharge his duties to the best of his
knowledge and ability. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6103;
Stephens v. State Bar, supra; Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d
550, 553 [107 P.2d 10]; Waterman v. State Bar, supra.)
In determining the proper degree of discipline, petitioner's
prior disciplinary record may be considered. (Herron v.
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State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 53, 65 [147 P.2d 543] .) In arriving
at its recommendation of a suspension for one year, the
Board of Governors relied upon three counts (Three, Four
and Five), which are not supported by the evidence, and
upon Count One, which vvas proved in a lesser degree than
that relied upon by the board. We have concluded that petitioner will be sufficiently punished if he is suspended from
the practice of law for six months.
It is ordered that Oliver 0. Clark be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months, commencing 30
days after the filing of this opinion.
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent.
Although petitioner was charged with six separate counts
of having violated his duties as an attorney, they all arose
out of the same transaction, that is, his conduct as the
guardian of the estate of George W. Bigelow, an incompetent.
The local administrative committee found that his alleged
misconduct amounted only to carelessness in handling and
keeping records of the assets of the estate. The majority
opinion determines that the third, fourth and :fifth counts
are not supported by the evidence. Counts one, two and six
are held to establish "gross negligence" on petitioner's part,
thus justifying discipline. I do not agree with this holding
for three reasons: (1) Negligence, ordinary or gross, is not
a proper ground for disbarment or suspension of a member of
the State Bar. (2) Even if it is, it must be negligent
conduct of an attorney toward his client in handling the
client's business. It does not apply where there is no attorneyclient relationship between the attorney and the one toward
whom he is negligent as we have here. (3) The evidence does
not establish gross negligence.
On the first point I have previously expressed myself in
Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal.2d 580, 585 [122 P.2d 549] ;
Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 [107 P.2d 10] and
In re McKenna, 16 Cal.2d 610, 612 [107 P.2d 258]. In
addition I wish to point out that negligence in the handling
of his client's affairs is not grounds for disbarment of an
attorney in a majority of the states. (See cases collected, 7
C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 23, p. 744; 5 Am.Jur., Attorneys
at Law, § 268, p. 423.)
The majority in this case goes a step further, however,
which brings me to the second point. It holds that the attorney may be suspended when the negligence occurs while
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he is acting in a capacity other than as an attorney; where he
is negligent with respect to his dealings with a third party,
not a client. In the instant case petitioner was the guardian
of the estate of an incompetent. He was not the attorney for
the estate or incompet'ent. The latter and petitioner had an
attorney. It is true that a fiduciary relation exists between
a guardian and his ward but his duty is only such as should
be exercised by a man of ordinary prudence in the management of his own business. (Estate of Wood, 159 Cal. 466
[114 P. 992, 36 L.R.A.N.S. 252] ; Estate of Boyes, 151 Cal.
143 [90 P. 454].) And it has been held that mismanagement
of another trust estate is not ground for removal as guardian
of the estate under consideration. (Heath v. Maddock, 81
N.J.Eq. 469 [86 A. 945], affd. 82 N.J.Eq. 366 [91 A. 1069] .)
Likewise an attorney should not be disbarred because, while
acting as a guardian but not as attorney, he is guilty of mismanagement of his ward's estate. Because an attorney is a
poor businessman in his dealings with another's property,
of which he has control, but not as an attorney, should not be
ground for disbarment and the majority opinion cites no case
so holding.
There are many ramifications to the rule stated by the
majority. The husband is the manager of the community property and he and his wife's relations are fiduciary. Would it
be said that whenever the husband happens to be an attorney,
a careless handling of the community property will be a
ground for his discipline as an attorney 1 The majority would
say that it could be. Likewise, the secretary or treasurer of
a club or corporation is careless in keeping its records and
handling its funds, may be disbarred if he is an attorney;
an attorney who borrows an automobile from a friend, not
a client, and his grossly negligent operation of it results in
its destruction, is subject to disbarment; a guardian who is
also an attorney but not for his ward's estate, is grossly negligent in the care of the property of his ward in an automobile and it is consumed by fire, may be disbarred; an attorney who is the guardian of the person of his ward but not as
attorney, would be exonerated as to damages for any conduct, short of wilful misconduct or intoxication, in driving
a vehicle causing injury to his ward, but he could be disbarred for such conduct. These and many more examples
could be given which emphasize the vice of the holding of
the majority opinion. The majority also point to the impracticability of requiring an attorney to be a superman,
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not only in his relations with his clients, but also with third
persons.
Gross negligence conveys no connotation of intentional
misconduct, wilfulness or intent to injure (Robertson v.
Brown, 37 Cal.App.2d 189 [99 P.2d 288] ; Sumner v. Edmunds, 130 Cal.App. 770 [21 P.2d 159]; Meek v. Fowler,
3 Cal.2d 420 [45 P.2d 194]; Browne v. Fernandez, 140 Cal.
App .. 689 [36 P.2d 122]), but it is "the want of that care
and diligence which even careless, thoughtless, or inattentive
persons are accustomed to exercise; the failure to take such
care as a person of common sense and reasonable skill in like
business but of careless habits would observe in avoiding injury to his own person or life under circumstances of equal
or similar danger. It is very great negligence; negligence materially greater than ordinary negligence, the difference being
one of degree, although sometimes it is said to be a difference
of kind; negligence of an aggravated character; and gross
failure to exercise proper care. The term implies a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort
to avoid them; an indifference to the things or welfare of
others. It refers to conduct which is positive or affirmative
rather than merely passive or negative." (65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 8d, p. 370.) Here, as stated in my third point, the
evidence was not sufficient to establish any intentional misconduct nor gross negligence.
On count one the board found petitioner guilty of commingling funds where he placed the ward's money in a separate envelope in his safe. The majority opinion correctly
holds that there was no commingling of funds. The money
was produced by petitioner from the envelope where it had
been all the time. It had remained there three years but
there was no showing of any misappropriation of it or intent
to do so, and the ward was not injured by its being so kept.
Yet the majority arrives at a finding of gross negligence
because petitioner's explanation does not set at rest "suspicions" and it "tests credulity," and that the evils inherent
in commingling are present where petitioner keeps the money
in his safe for three years and forgets its presence there.
Disciplinary matters are not and should not be decided on
"suspicions." The only evidence shows that the money was
there at all times, was never misappropriated and was always
a part of the ward's estate. If the money had been deposited
in the bank in petitioner's name as guardian for three years
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but was forgotten, it would not be called gross negligence.
At most it would be ordinary negligence.
The second count deals with a failure of petitioner to
include some $1,800 in his accounting. That' was the same
money that was in the envelope, and the same comments are
applicable to it as were made with respect to the first count.
Naturally he could not list it in the account if he had forgotten about it. There is no proof of any intent to misappropriate it and it was not misappropriated. The inadvertent
omission of one asset of a ward's estate from the guardian's
account can hardly be said to constitute ordinary negligence,
much less gross negligence.
The sixth count deals with the failure to file an account
as guardian until ordered by the court, and that the account
filed was inaccurate and necessitated an independent audit.
Petitioner did file an account after his appointment. If it
was inaccurate, that was nothing more than negligence, as
conceded by petitioner. It was not gross negligence. The
account was filed and the ward was not injured. Certainly
it cannot be said that such conduct constituted a failure to
exercise the care a person of careless habits would exercise
or gross negligence.
In my opinion the record in this case does not disclose any
conduct of petitioner which can be said to even remotely
justify discipline, and I would therefore dismiss the proceeding against him.

